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Since the early 1980s, the interest in the nature and size of the non-measured 
economy (both the informal and the illegal one) was born among researchers in the 
US.  Since  then,  several  models  to  estimate  the  shadow  and/or  the  underground 
economy appeared in the literature, each with its own theoretical pros and cons. In 
this paper we show that it is possible to overcome earlier expressed criticism of the 
Tanzi-model (1983). Its lack of a base year without any underground economy can 
be  overcome,  by  using  the  natural  experiment  of  the  introduction  of  the  Euro. 
However,  this  paper  also  comes  up  with  new  criticism.  It  shows  that  the  crucial 
relationship of the Tanzi-model between taxes and the demand for cash money is 
not  time  robust,  hence  the  model  is  not  useful  for  estimating  the  underground 
economy  nowadays.  We  believe  that  the  change  in  financial  conditions  could 
partially explain the decline in the relevance of taxes as a means to evaluate the 
underground  economy.  We  build  a  revised  Tanzi  model  and  try  to  find  variables 
apart from tax evasion incentives in order to explain the underground economy. 
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The notions of black money, tax evasion and illegal trading are concepts familiar to almost every 
citizen irrespective of his or her level of economic literacy. Hollywood’s classics, such as The 
Godfather, transformed a romanticized description of the underground business into a mental 
scheme for viewers to construct their beliefs upon. Although portrayed in detail in the movies, 
the “reality” of the underground economy remains obscure and its proportions remain hard to 
define and measure.  
 
Terms like the underground economy, the shadow economy, the black or grey economy, are still 
used quite arbitrarily. Even when looking at the most recent and mostly quoted recent literature, 
this confusion does not cease. To give an example: Is tax evasion – an activity essential in the 
Tanzi model we want to test here - part of the shadow economy (Enste and Schneider 2006) or of 
the underground economy (Schneider and Enste 2000)? Or doesn’t it belong to the shadow/ 
underground economy at all, as suggested by Schneider and Enste (2002)? 
 
For Schneider and Enste (2002) the informal sector comprises activities, which are not part of 
national  income  accounting.  These  include,  apart  from  regular  activities  such  as  helping  
neighbors,  irregular  and  criminal  activities.  The  shadow  economy  is  defined  by  irregular 
activities  (e.g.  illicit  labor),  and  the  underground  economy  is  defined  by  criminal  activities. 
According to this view, tax evasion is neither part of the formal nor part of the informal sector, 
because it does not produce any value added. For this reason, Schneider and Enste (2002) also 
explicitly criticize the demand for cash approaches, which deal with tax evasion and to which the 
Tanzi model belongs, for overestimating the shadow economy. Contrary, in Enste and Schneider 
(2006, p.37) tax evasion is given as an example for the shadow economy (as opposed to drugs 
and  fencing,  which  are  listed  as  examples  for  the  underground  economy).  In  the  money 
laundering literature, however, tax evasion is seen as part of the underground economy, since it 
is related to the predicate crime fraud (see Unger 2007), which conforms with the classification 




Though  each  of  the  classification  schemes  depends  on  different  criteria  which  makes  the 
distinctions above understandable, there is clearly a confusion in terminology. This confusion in 
definitions also shows in what is being measured.  
 
In the following we will use the term which Vito Tanzi - the author of the model we want to 
investigate- chose: the underground economy. We will use this term in a very broad sense. By 
doing so, we encompass all types of activities which are currently not measured by statisticians 
when composing estimates of the national economy i.e. no matter whether they are informal, 
illegal  or  criminal  activities,  and  no  matter  whether they  produce  value  added  or  are just  a 
transfer of funds. We will also use the terms shadow economy and underground economy largely 
as  synonyms  here,  though  we  are  aware  of  the  urgent  need  of  commonly  accepted  and 
standardized definitions. 
This paper looks into Tanzi’s (1983) classical approach to measure the size of the underground 
economy and shows that its implied causality is not time robust. 
The underlying intuition was developed, while trying to estimate the size and the dynamics of the 
European Union’s underground economy after the introduction of the Euro, using the monetarist 
approach developed in the early 1980s by Vito Tanzi. We soon discovered that our data did not 
support his approach and this led us to question the method’s robustness. Before going into our 
research, it is worthwhile noting the importance of studying the Underground Economy and the 
place of Tanzi’s model in previous research. 
During  the  early  1980s  in  the  US,  the  interest  in  the  nature  and  size  of  the  non-measured 
economy was born among researchers. (Tanzi, 1999) This was due to the growing concern that 
official recordings were not a good fit for the true developments of the economy. Since then, 
there have been numerous attempts to quantify the underground economy in various countries 
and  using  different  methods.  Apart  from  diverse  assumptions  there  were  common  goals:  to 
increase  governmental  and  public  awareness  of  the  underground  economy  and  to  transform 
economic policies such that they efficiently address the real economy and increase aggregate 
social welfare. The question that naturally follows is: do these distinct measurements of the 
underground economy converge, and if not, which one is the most reliable?   
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A  direct  measurement  of  the  underground  economy  would  imply  voluntary  participation  in 
surveys estimating its size and thus relying substantially on the honesty of the surveyed. As 
scientific measurements strive to be independent of personal speculation and to selection biases, 
this  method  cannot  be  thought  as  reliable  in  capturing  the  size  or  the  dynamics  of  the 
underground economy. 
In the following, we will present a short overview of the co-evolution of five indirect types of 
explanatory  models,  while  taking  into  account  the  pros  and  cons  for  each  methodology. 
Schneider and Enste (2002) discuss in detail the evolution of methods to capture the size and the 
dynamics of the shadow and/or underground economies.  
 
Measuring the Underground Economy: A literature review 
The first method implies looking at the difference in accounted incomes and expenses. If the 
latter is greater, then the difference must consist of undeclared income constituting a means 
obtained  through  the  underground  economy.  Unfortunately,  Thomas  (1992)  argues  that 
inconsistencies  in  measurements  both  unwillingly  and  willingly,  cast  serious  doubt  on  the 
measurements of the shadow economy.  
The second approach considers labor as an input factor for both the underground and the legal 
economies,  whereby  changes  in  the  labor  force  indicates  the  dynamics  of  the  former.  The 
weakness of this accounting method, as stated by Schneider and Enste (2002), is that it does not 
allow for changes in the labor force that are inherent and independent from the underground 
sector. Therefore, an ageing population might reflect a lower share of workers to total population 
without implying a proportional increase of the shadow economy. In addition, illegal migrants 
and other social groups not working in the legal sector might have a significant impact on the 
measurements. 
The third approach developed by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Lacko (1996) considers 
capital to be the main indicator of the underground economy, referring mainly to electricity 
consumption. The criticism Schneider and Enste (2002) present to both models is that they can 
neither account for exogenous changes in electricity use, nor can they capture the interpersonal  
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unaccounted trade that makes little use of capital. The critics also argue that indexing countries 
according  to  electricity/GDP  and  using  an  estimation  of  the  shadow  economy  in  one  base 
country to compute the underground economies of the other countries in the sample assumes 
constant possibly important country and culture specific factors.  
The fourth approach is referred to as the MIMIC models which bring together expected causes 
and effects (or indicators) of the underground sector. These are said to be easily observed as 
opposed to the real underground economy. The underlying idea is that we can use measurements 
of both the causal and of the indicator variables, in a time frame to infer the movements of the 
intermediate/ middle value: the unobserved size of the underground economy, which then is 
reported  in  percentage  of  GDP  (Dell’Anno  and  Schneider,  2003).  This  method,  although 
seemingly more complex is heavily criticized by Breuch (2005) who argues that it is vague in its 
specification,  sensitive  to  the  units  of  measurement  and  hard  to  reproduce  (hence  possibly 
subjective). Breuch (2005) also argues that the MIMIC model relies too much on the public’s 
interest in large estimations. Moreover, the MIMIC model measures only the change in the size 
of the underground economy and not the actual size of the underground economy. This means 
that estimations from another source are needed for the base year, a weakness that to our surprise 
is passed on by Schneider and Enste (2002) as a critique to the Tanzi-model.  
The fifth method is the monetarist approach developed by Feige (1979) and Tanzi (1983). Feige 
(1979)  tried  to  estimate  the  size of  the  US  economy  from  the  perspective  of payments  and 
transactions. He assumed the aggregate money supply to be a good indicator of the size of the 
real economy and made estimations based on the Fisher MV=PT equation. This equation says 
that money M times the velocity V equals the price level P times the level of transactions T in an 
economy.  Tanzi  (1983)  used  the  constructed  aggregate  money  demand  of  Feige  (1979)  and 
compared it to the recorded money supply. He then suggested that the overall excess of money 
supply was unrecorded money used in the underground economy. 
By means of this short literature review we hope to have shown the substantial difference in 
approaches. This would not necessarily be a disturbing fact had the resulting measurements be 




The methodology of the Tanzi model 
As previously discussed, Tanzi (1980) constructed an estimate of the money demand, using the 
model of Feige (1979), and compared it to the recorded money supply in the US, using yearly 
data from 1929 to 1980. In his seminal paper, Tanzi (1980) suggests that one of the main factors 
that deter individuals from legally transacting in the US is that they have to give away part of 
these transactions in the form of taxes. Tanzi (1983) started to examine the view of Cagan (1958) 
who had previously argued that, although cash does not pay interest, it is and will be used as a 
means to avoid paying taxes.  
Focusing thus on tax evasion, Tanzi (1983) builds a model where the ratio of cash to non-cash 
money supply is generated by the ratio of personal income tax to total adjusted income, the ratio 
of legal cash remuneration to total personal income, the interest rate, and real income per capita.  
The regression he used is presented hereunder. 
(1) 
In this regression, the cash to money supply ratio (C/M2) is influenced by the personal income 
tax rates (T), the amount of cash wages to national income (WS/NI), the annual interest rates (R) 
and income per capita (Y). Note that the natural logarithm of the variables is used instead of the 
actual values, which makes it a multiplicative multivariate estimation model. For the actual data, 
see appendix 1. 
  
Tanzi  (1983)  uses  regression  (1)  to  estimate  the  relation  between  taxes  and  cash  to  money 
supply. He then chooses a base year where he assumes there is no underground economy and 
uses the estimated coefficient for tax rates and the actual development of tax rates to estimate 
how  much  cash  is  used  in  the  underground  economy.  Finally,  the  amount  of  non-disclosed 
transactions (i.e. the size of the underground economy) is found by using the Fisher equation, 
where Tanzi (1983) assumes the velocity of “black money” to be similar to that of legal funds. 
Naturally,  this  estimation  is  only  possible  when  the  coefficient  for  tax  rates  is  found  to  be 
significant and positive, and therefore, relationship (1) is crucial to the model.  
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This methodology that has been pioneered in the early 1980’s has remained one of the foremost 
used tools to measure the developments of the underground economy. We would argue it is the 
intuitive aspect of this model that makes it so attractive to both academics and the large public, 
especially as the relationship the model encapsulates, has proven resistant to a number of new 
econometric developments. In the next section we will show the survival power of the Tanzi-
model against earlier criticism.  
 
Correcting the Tanzi model in reaction to earlier criticism  
Although presenting robust results, Tanzi’s (1983) method was criticized by Schneider and Enste 
(2002) who argued that he assumes a base year for which there is no shadow economy without 
enlisting reasonable grounds for doing so, that there is more to tax evasion than the size of tax 
rates (i.e. tax morality, trust in the government etc). Further they argue that he does not take into 
account the usage of the dollar abroad as international currency and finally, that in the particular 
case of the US, increases in currency demand could also be due to an exogenous decreasing 
demand for deposits over the respective time period. 
We will now continue to show that these points of critique are not crucially targeting the external 
validity of Tanzi’s (1983) results.  We will show that we can address  and to a large extent 
eliminate these points of critique if we apply the model to the Euro zone, after the introduction of 
the Euro in 2001.  




It  showed  (as  presented  above)  the  cash  to  money  supply  ratio  (M1/M3)
1  as  depending  on 
different tax rates (Tn), taxes collected by different forms of government (GT), the amount of 
income received in cash to personal income (WS/Y), interest rates (R), income per capita (Y/N) 
and the size of the captured drugs activities per unit of consumption (D/C) (see appendix 2 for a 
                                                           
1 Because of differences in aggregation levels used in EU-data en US-data, we could not produce a time series C/M2 
for the EU. We think that the ratio M1/M3 for the EU is the closest related to the ratio C/M2 in the US. 
1
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detailed description of the data collection). Given the fact that we have data on Money Supply 
only at a European level, our initial regression was based on European Averages. 
Taking the critiques one by one, we could chose the year 2002 as the year with no shadow 
economy since this was the year of the currency change in the adhering countries. It was not 
possible at the time to fuel the underground economy by means of Euro cash and coins, as the 
old currency if illegal could not have been transformed in Euros. Thus the choice of the initial 
point is not the result of a rule of thumb, but the result of a natural experiment that took place in 
the European Union. Therefore, we can reasonably eliminate this point of critique.  
Addressing the second point of critique, one can group taxes according to the collecting authority 
(at a national and supranational level) and look at the separate impact. Moreover, one can also 
include data on drugs trading and therefore address in more detail the specific components of the 
underground economy: the informal, the illegal and the criminal activities.  
As for the last two points of critique, the ECB reports that the introduction of the Euro was 
surrounded  by  skepticism  from  foreign  investors  and  thus  was  assimilated  as  international 
currency only later in its existence
2. Furthermore, given the increasing expansion of non-cash 
transactions  and  services,  which  corroborates  with  a  period  of  non-violent  economic 
development, it is unreasonable to assume that the demand for deposits has significantly lowered 
if at all, between 2002 and 2009 in the Euro zone. 
Thus, we believe it is possible to construct a model essentially similar to that of Tanzi (1983) that 
addresses all critique by expanding its explanatory variables set to account for illegal activities 
and trust in the Government. However, an argument can be made against this expansion, as we 










Correcting for the Unit Root problem 
Having constructed this model and having had quite disappointing results, our attention turned to 
the soundness of the original model for the US
3. Having performed a Dickey Fuller test (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979)on the data used by Tanzi (1983) we realized that the model suffered of a unit 
root problem (see Table 1). This means that one OLS requirement, stationarity of the stochastic 
process,  is  not  fulfilled.  If  an  equation  has  a  unit  root  in  econometrics,  the  model  is 
underdetermined, which means that both the dependent and the independent variables have a 
similar trend which is determined outside the model in question. This implies that the model 
gives a high R-squared without it having any real explanatory power. Granger and Newbold 
(1974) called such estimates spurious regression results.  
Furthermore, we observed later research using the Tanzi-model that did not correct for a unit root 
i.e. Albu et al (2002) and Ahmed and Qazi Masood (1995). 
   
Table 1: Results of unit root testing for variables used in the model of Tanzi (1980) 







Cash to money supply (C/M2)  -2.389     -3.579     -2.929      -2.600  Yes 
Tax rate (T)        1.480        3.579        2.929        2.600  Yes 
Income per capita (Y)        0.050        3.579        2.929        2.600  Yes  
Source: Made by the authors using the data of Tanzi (1983) 
 
Econometric theory suggests it is possible to correct a model with a stochastic process, by taking 
the first difference of the variables and redoing the regression using the differences instead of the 
variables in effect. Having changed this in the model of Tanzi (1983) we got regression (3). The 
coefficients of this regression are depicted in appendix 4. 
                                                           
3 The fact that we had disappointing results is not a matter of interest for this paper. We believe that our 
disappointing results can easily be due to the lack of sufficient data. We mention this only to inform the reader about 




The regression results show that the Tanzi-model survives the unit root critique. The coefficient 
on taxes is statistically significant and correctly signed over this period. Moreover, the model has 
a high explanatory power. This means that the relationship between taxes and the cash to money 
supply ratio still holds, when correcting for the unit root in the data. Apparently the variables are 
integrated of order one and the relationship is not the result of a common trend.  
We  will  now  show  that  despite  all  our  efforts  to  save  the  validity  of  the  Tanzi-model  by 
correcting for unit roots, an even greater problem occurred, that seriously endangers the model. 
This is the lack of time robustness. The causal relationship between taxes and the size of the cash 
supply is not time robust, even if we take a closer look at the time frame used by Tanzi (1983) 
himself, and even less so, if we expand it to present day. 
 
New critique on the Tanzi model: Relationship not time robust 
We used the data Tanzi (1983) disclosed in his paper and updated it accordingly until 2006. In 
order to avoid structural breaks due to new datasets, we collected data from 1975 – 2006, while 
the data of Tanzi actually ended in 1980. The overlapping 5 years allowed us to control for the 
quality of our data set merger. 
On this extended panel data we ran what in econometrics is called rolling regressions. This 
method allows for a regression to be run on a panel data for given time sub samples. Figure 1 
presents the dynamics of the β coefficient of the tax ratio on the cash surplus for 57 consecutive 
periods of 30 years.  
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Figure 1: Moving tax coefficient for 57 consecutive 30-year sub samples 
 
Source: Made by the authors using regression (4) on the expanded panel data of 1929-2006. One 
should read this figure as follows: The straight line shows how the coefficient of tax develops 
over time with 30 year periods (the first observation is 1929-1959, the next observation is the 
period 1930-1960 etc.) the dashed lines above and under the coefficient line show the confidence 
interval of the coefficient on a 5% significance level. This means that when zero lies within the 
confidence interval (like happens for the first time in the period of 1933-1963) the coefficient is 
not significant different from zero at the 5% significance level.  
 
Figure 1 shows that a significant causal relationship can be identified in the first 4 periods, while 
the β coefficient approached zero for most of the rest of the sample originally used by Tanzi 
(1983).
4 The relationship does not hold in the extended dataset either. Although the coefficient 
does increase in the latter period, with the standard deviation being so large, it is not a significant 
relationship. 
This result complements the critique of Schneider and Enste (2002). One of their arguments was 
that  the  year  where  Tanzi  (1983)  assumes  the  underground  economy  to  be  nonexistent  is 
arbitrarily chosen. We would like to point out that even if 1929 were the state of nature with no 
underground economy, the relationship would still suffer from temporal invalidity. In this sense, 
                                                           
4 That the coefficient is significant over the whole period and only really significant in the first four periods is due 
tothe fact that most of the variation in the data takes place in these early years (see appendix 2). If one would take 
out the first 15 observations (the years 1929-1943), the relation between the tax rate and currency to money supply 
over the ‘whole’ period becomes insignificant on a 5%-level, using regression (4).  
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we believe Schneider and Enste (2002) hinted at the right problem, but did not consistently prove 
it. 
 
Some explanation of the new results  
Tanzi (1983) built a model to estimate the size of the underground economy using taxes as a tool. 
His model presented robust results at the time of the publication and these results, although 
suffering from a unit root problem, were intuitively convincing.. When corrected for unit roots, 
the  Tanzi-model  still  provided  significant  and  correctly  signed  results.  However,  a  more 
fragmented analysis of the regression shows that its overall significance is driven by only a 
relatively short period of time. Only the first time range between 1930 and 1960, confirms the 
relationship between taxes and excess demand for cash money.  
In view of Hume (1740) we cannot infer the existence of a state of nature in the present or future 
because of its consistent past occurrence. In line with this, it would be wrong to assume away 
that taxes always positively affect the size of the underground economy, just by looking at a non-
falsified hypothesis of Tanzi (1983). The role of science as seen by Popper (1963) is to question 
these theories and to try to falsify them, as Tanzi himself suggested in “Uses and Abuses of 
Estimates of the Underground Economy” (1999). 
Therefore, using inductivist theory we have shown that once you falsify the Tanzi-model it is not 
rational to expect the relationship between taxes and the shadow economy to still be present in 
the way the model initially suggested. This induction however, has no bearing on the truth value 
of the Tanzi-model upon its publication. Moreover, the correction for a unit root we have done 
using the data of Tanzi (1983) does corroborate to falsifying his findings especially in the earlier 
part of his time sample. 
If one were to trust in the error elimination process that advances scientific knowledge (Popper, 
1994)  one  should  also  inquire  into  the  reasons  for  the  due  course  decomposition  of  the 
relationship. Could it be that the model was valid, and the relationship not only present but also 
powerful enough to represent the size of the underground economy in the early 1930? 
A short historical perspective reveals the immense changes of setting that took place in the US 
since the early 1930 recession, to a point where we can think of almost reversed settings. As  
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opposed  to  present  times,  before  the  Great  Depression  US  companies  were  producing  at 
overcapacity and exporting hugely. The US balance of payments implied a strong currency that 
could not efficiently compete in exports. The domestic market was left to accommodate for non-
exported surpluses, the government did not contribute to absorb supply, companies were closed 
hence unemployment rose, banks’ balance sheets contracted and the situation spiraled out of 
control (Eichengreen, 1992).  
Bearing in mind the historical context, could it be that major capital outflows combined with the 
soaring unemployment caused by the dismissal of national industries had an impact on the view 
people took towards taxes? Could it be that in the face of such financial hardship to which the 
government was not seen to actively contribute to ameliorate, intuitively people lost faith in their 
government and sought to avoid paying taxes? When discussing the approach of Feige (1959), 
Tanzi (1980) also mentions government’s perceived reliability to be one factor non-accounted 
for, but with a significant toll on the size of the underground economy.  
We believe that as a result of the economic climate present in the US in the early 1930s, taxes 
could have been used as an instrument to uncover the dimensions of the underground economy. 
However, as the economic  climate improved and taxes regained their endorsement  from the 
public moral, such a method might have lost its ability to grasp the reasons for the existence of 
the underground economy.  
 
A revised Tanzi model for the underground economy? 
The  fact  that  the  Tanzi  model  turned  out  not  to  give  a  convincing  explanation  of  today’s 
underground economy, does not necessarily mean that the model per se is wrong. Could it be 
then that Tanzi’s idea of defining the underground economy by the amount of excess demand for 
cash is right, and that tax evasion is no longer the appropriate explanatory variable? If Tanzi’s 
intuition that people, who want to hide income or wealth from the government for whatever 
reason, hold it in cash money is right, then excess cash holding might still be a good proxy for 
estimating the underground economy. Other factors than tax evasion due to high tax rates might 
then explain this underground economy.   
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Unemployment might have an impact on the shadow economy. Increased unemployment might 
lead to a crowding out of illegal low skilled workers by legal higher skilled workers, who – 
under the threat of being unemployed otherwise – might accept lower paid jobs. There might 
therefore be a negative relationship between unemployment and the shadow economy (which 
according  to  our  model  pays  in  cash).  But  unemployment  can  also  be  an  incentive  for 
entrepreneurs to hire more illegal workers in order to save costs in difficult times; hence there 
might be a positive relationship between unemployment and the shadow economy. We therefore 
tried to use unemployment figures instead of tax rates in our revised Tanzi-model.  
In the literature also a number of other key factors that influence the underground economy are 
put  forward.  Schneider  and  Enste  (2000)  and  Blackburn,  Bose  and  Caposso  (2009)  give  a 
literature overview over these factors influencing the underground economy.  
Underground activities can be influenced by public policy and public administration. Apart from 
the burden of taxes and social security, the complexity and arbitrariness of the tax system, the 
extent of bureaucracy and regulations, and corruption are mentioned. Perhaps these factors have 
nowadays become more important than taxes and tax rates for the underground economy. We 
operationalized some of these public policy and public administration factors by adding to the 
tax rate as used in Tanzi (1983), the amount of government expenditures in relation to GDP 
(measured  as  a  share/percentage),  police  expenditures  (measured  in  amount  of  dollars  and 
amount of dollars per capita) and judicial expenditures (also measured in amount of dollars and 
amount of dollars per capita).  
Since  the  underground  economy  includes  also  criminal  activities,  the  underground  economy 
could be largely influenced by those crimes that generate the most (cash) money. When thinking 
about  crimes  that  generate  relatively  large  amounts  of  (cash)  money,  drugs  are  normally 
mentioned  as  a  stylized  fact.  But  it  could  be,  of  course,  that  other  (property)  crimes  also 
influence the size of the underground economy. We operationalized these crimes by using the 
total crime rate (measured in the amount of crimes and amount of crimes per capita), statistics on 
the amount of drugs use (as a proxy for the size of the drugs market), the amount of robberies, 
burglaries, larceny-thefts, vehicle-thefts, property crimes in general (all measured as a frequency) 
and corruption (measured as a perception index). We included corruption specifically because it 
could facilitate tax evasion.  
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Another factor that could influence the shadow economy is literacy and inequality. The World 
Bank argues that illiteracy prevents people from opening bank accounts and forces them into the 
cash economy and often also shadow economy (World Bank, 2006). We operationalized this 
indicator by taking the percentage that completed less than 5 years of elementary school and the 
percentage that completed high school as proxies for respectively illiteracy and literacy.  We 
checked  the  robustness  with  respect  to  gender  and  race.  The  cash  intensive  part  of  the 
underground economy can be one of low skilled workers and poor people rather than one of rich 
tax evaders, who can probably find other – less cash intense – means for their activities. What 
the French author Anatole France noted already at the beginning of the twentieth century, could 
still to be true today: ‘It is only the poor who pay cash, and that not from virtue, but because they 
are refused credit’. This result is supported by findings of anthropologists in the US, who talk 
about  ‘the  cash  ghetto’  implying  that  ghettos  are  very  often  forced  into  the  informal  sector 
because of lack of formal structures there and have to trade with cash money (Weatherford, 
1997).  We operationalized inequality with income inequality statistics that can be calculated 
using a Lorenz-curve on income (the Gini-index of income inequality).  
We estimated the Tanzi model for the US by including at least one indicator for each of the 
arguments listed in the literature as key factors influencing the shadow economy. Table 2 lists 
the variables we used, their source, the period for which these data were available and the results 
of using these variables in the following regression: 
 
2





Y R Variable of Interest
M NI
    ∆ = ∆ +∆ +∆ +∆    
   
                       (5) 
 
Note that the left hand side has changed compared to the original regression (4). We corrected 
here for the amount of US dollars used outside the US. The Fed publishes figures on the total 
amount  of  US  dollar  in  circulation  outside  the  US  since  1965.
5  By  doing  so,  we  want  to 
                                                           





strengthen the estimation model, since the international use of US dollars has been criticized as a 
weakness of the model (Schneider and Enste, 2002)
6. The right hand side of equation (5) lists Y 
(per capita income), R (the annual interest rates) and WS/NI (cash wages to national income) as 
control variables and the potential candidate from the literature that might influence the shadow 
economy. 
 
Table 2: Potential candidates for a revised Tanzi model.  
Variable that influences the 
shadow economy  
Data source   Period  Result 
Unemployment rate  Bureau of Labor Statistics  1948-2009   Insignificant effect 
Public policy and public administration variables 
Tax rate  Tanzi (1983) and IRS.gov  1929-2006  Significant positive effect, but 
not time robust, see figure 1 
Government expenditures as a 
share of (real) GDP per capita 
Penn World Table  1950-2007  Insignificant effect 
Police expenditures  Bureau of Justice Statistics  1982-2006  Insignificant effect 
Judicial expenditures  Bureau of Justice Statistics  1982-2006  Insignificant effect 
Police expenditures per capita  Bureau of Justice Statistics  1982-2006  Insignificant effect 
Judicial expenditures per capita  Bureau of Justice Statistics  1982-2006  Insignificant effect 
Crime variables 
Total crime rate  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Insignificant effect 
Total crime rate per capita  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Insignificant effect 
Drugs use  The White House, National 
Drug Control Strategy 
1990-2007  Insufficient data. (We also have 
data for 1979, 1982, 1985 and 
1988, but these can’t be used in 
this type of analysis because 
these are not consecutive years) 
                                                           
6 We did not correct for the international use of US dollars in the analysis leading to figure 1, since we have this data 
only from 1965 onwards, which means we cannot replicate the results of Tanzi (1980) in the period 1929-1980.  
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Amount of Robberies  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Insignificant effect 
Amount of Burglaries  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Significant negative effect but 
with the unexpected sign 
Amount of Larceny-thefts  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Insignificant effect 
Amount of Vehicle thefts  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Insignificant effect 
Amount of Property crimes  FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 
Disaster Centre 
1980-2008  Insignificant effect 
Corruption  Transparency International  1995-2009  Insufficient data 
Literacy and inequality variables 
Percentage that finished less than 5 
years of elementary school  
National Center for 
Education Statistics 
1962-2009  Insignificant effect 
Percentage that finished high 
school 
National Center for 
Education Statistics 
1962-2009  Significant negative effect for 
males, but not time robust, see 
the figure in appendix 4 
Income inequality  US Census Bureau  1967-2009  Insignificant effect 
All above mentioned results are evaluated at a 5% significance level. All detailed regression results for the last 
column,  are  shown  in  appendix  4.  We  have  tested  the  robustness  with  respect  to  time,  correcting  for  the 
international use of US dollars, the three control variables Y, R and WS/NI and other significance levels. These 
robustness checks are not shown here to keep the table readable, but they can be retrieved by contacting the 
authors. 
 
Interpretation of the results 
As can be seen in table 2, the revised Tanzi - model still looks very poor, since we could not find 
a  good  alternative  for  the  tax  rate  used  by  Tanzi  (1983)  as  an  explanation  for  excess  cash 
demand. We tried a large amount of different variables to capture different parts and aspects of 
the shadow economy, without a fruitful result. For those who want to continue our efforts and 
save the Tanzi - model, we advise to focus on tax complexity and tax morale (see e.g. Torgler 






With this paper we have attempted to consistently falsify the model of Tanzi (1983). In due 
process we have drawn the reader’s attention to the works of his critics, to what their doubts 
were and concluded that they did not advertently falsify his theory. Although past economic 
conditions could have contributed to its past high explanatory power, we show by means of new 
econometric  techniques  that  Tanzi’s  (1983)  model  for  estimating  the  underground  economy 
currently lacks external validity. High tax rates seem to be no longer the major driving force for 
holding  excess  cash  money.  Also  other  variables,  like  unemployment,  public  policy,  crime, 
literacy and inequality do not seem to explain the shadow economy measured by excess cash 
demand.  Which  leaves  us  to  question  which  other  factors  might  explain  the  underground 
economy and whether the underground economy can be measured at all nowadays by estimating 
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Appendix 1: The data for the US, 1929-2006, to draw figure 1 
Year  C  M2  T  Y  WS/NI  R 
1929  3,64  46,60  4,04  2,58  59,50  3,34 
1930  3,37  49,70  2,63  2,31  62,62  3,31 
1931  3,65  42,70  1,81  2,11  66,83  2,99 
1932  4,62  36,10  2,83  1,81  71,96  2,80 
1933  4,76  32,20  3,40  1,76  72,76  2,56 
1934  4,65  34,40  4,00  1,89  69,26  2,37 
1935  4,78  39,10  4,41  2,04  64,99  1,93 
1936  5,22  43,50  6,31  2,30  65,24  1,64 
1937  5,49  45,70  5,38  2,39  63,82  1,55 
1938  5,42  45,50  4,05  2,28  65,17  1,48 
1939  6,01  49,30  4,00  2,43  64,52  1,36 
1940  6,70  55,20  4,09  2,59  62,56  1,22 
1941  8,20  62,50  6,63  2,98  60,52  1,12 
1942  10,90  71,20  11,32  3,40  60,50  1,03 
1943  15,81  89,90  14,65  3,87  62,44  0,87 
1944  20,88  106,80  13,89  4,10  64,29  0,84 
1945  25,10  126,60  14,17  3,99  65,05  0,85 
1946  26,52  139,00  11,97  3,36  62,84  0,82 
1947  26,60  146,00  12,03  3,23  63,25  0,85 
1948  26,00  147,80  9,41  3,31  61,87  0,87 
1949  25,60  147,70  9,01  3,27  63,36  0,90 
1950  25,10  151,00  10,22  3,49  62,24  0,92 
1951  25,40  155,50  11,93  3,72  62,90  1,02 
1952  26,70  164,50  12,87  3,80  64,86  1,14 
1953  27,70  171,10  12,80  3,88  66,27  1,30 
1954  27,50  176,70  11,58  3,76  65,80  1,30 
1955  27,60  183,60  11,78  3,95  64,54  1,36 
1956  27,90  186,70  12,19  3,96  65,83  1,58 
1957  28,30  191,70  12,23  3,96  66,04  2,08 
1958  28,30  201,60  12,17  3,89  66,07  2,20 
1959  29,00  211,00  12,60  4,05  64,61  2,36 
1960  29,00  210,80  12,47  4,08  65,41  2,58 
1961  28,90  223,40  12,76  4,11  65,17  2,73 
1962  30,00  236,60  12,83  4,28  64,51  3,23 
1963  31,50  251,40  13,02  4,39  64,15  3,34 
1964  33,50  266,40  11,84  4,56  64,04  3,47 
1965  35,00  287,40  11,50  4,77  63,24  3,73 
1966  37,00  312,10  11,93  4,99  63,43  4,12 
1967  39,00  335,10  12,42  5,07  64,48  4,32 
Year  C  M2  T  Y  WS/NI  R 
1968  41,80  364,00  13,78  5,24  65,00  4,36 
1969  44,70  391,80  14,30  5,32  66,17  4,57 
1970  47,60  402,80  13,26  5,25  67,68  4,98 
1971  51,00  454,80  12,65  5,35  66,66  4,77 
1972  54,30  498,00  12,52  5,61  65,92  4,62 
1973  59,20  548,10  13,04  5,96  67,69  5,82 
1974  64,50  594,20  13,64  5,89  65,97  7,14 
1975  71,00  642,20  13,13  5,78  65,06  5,96 
1976  77,70  698,20  13,36  6,04  64,52  5,32 
1977  84,30  775,50  13,68  6,32  63,61  5,24 
1978  92,80  840,60  14,33  6,57  63,32  5,87 
1979  101,80  915,50  14,56  6,72  61,96  7,41 
1980  111,00  982,60  15,51  6,65  63,34  8,52 
1981  118,95  1254,69  16,09  12,55  55,37  15,91 
1982  127,76  1379,95  14,81  13,80  55,68  12,04 
1983  140,09  1553,70  13,83  15,54  54,65  8,96 
1984  152,01  1682,56  13,75  16,83  53,30  10,17 
1985  162,29  1831,78  13,83  18,32  53,64  7,97 
1986  174,28  1949,22  14,54  19,49  54,30  6,61 
1987  188,61  2042,28  13,12  20,42  54,37  6,74 
1988  205,06  2161,30  13,21  21,61  53,95  7,59 
1989  217,33  2277,37  13,12  22,77  53,81  9,11 
1990  235,07  2416,82  12,95  24,17  54,18  8,15 
1991  259,00  2488,11  12,75  24,88  53,94  5,82 
1992  279,13  2443,67  12,94  24,44  53,89  3,64 
1993  307,85  2367,32  13,32  23,67  53,18  3,11 
1994  340,74  2347,78  13,50  23,48  52,27  4,38 
1995  366,79  2422,56  13,86  24,23  52,41  5,87 
1996  382,32  2631,46  14,34  26,31  52,17  5,35 
1997  409,99  2853,58  14,48  28,54  52,34  5,54 
1998  442,15  3124,73  14,42  31,25  53,09  5,49 
1999  486,34  3413,14  14,85  34,13  53,36  5,19 
2000  522,77  3681,45  15,26  36,81  54,01  6,35 
2001  555,01  4061,89  14,23  40,62  53,91  3,82 
2002  608,95  4403,08  13,03  44,03  53,12  1,72 
2003  647,64  4711,81  11,90  47,12  52,24  1,15 
2004  680,67  4918,15  12,10  49,18  51,51  1,45 
2005  710,10  5155,11  12,45  51,55  50,57  3,34 




Appendix 2: Data sources 
 
 
For the EU: 
 
M1 and M3: European Central Bank:  
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ 
 
Tax data: The European Commission Taxation and Customs Union report 2009 Report: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database 
 
Interest rates, consumption per capita, income per capita and wages and salaries: Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/interest_rates/data/database 
 




For the US: 
 
M0, M1, M2 and interest rates: Federal Reserve Bank Data: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist2.txt (M1 and M0 in the US 1975 –Aug 
2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt (M1 and M2 in the US 1975 –
Aug 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist5.txt (M2-M1 as in Tanzi), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm#top (monthly interest on 1-month CDs) 
 
Income per capita, Government share of GDP: Penn World Table: 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt63/pwt63_form.php 
 
Wages and Salaries to personal disposable income per capita: U.S. Department of 





2009&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid Transforming the real income per capita 
data in 2005 US$ into 1972 US$ terms has been done using an inflation calculator, the method 
and the program easily downloadable at: 
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Calculators/Inflation_Rate_Calculator.asp 
 
Tax data: Internal Revenue Service: 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96679,00.html#_grp8 
 
Crime data: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Disaster Centre: 
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm 
 
Police and Judicial expenditures: Bureau of Justice Statistics: 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/exptyptab.cfm 
 
Unemployment data: Bureau of Labor Statistics: 
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet, monthly data, calculated the annual rate: 
sum of the months/12 
 
Income inequality: US Census Bureau:  
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/IE-1.pdf (GINI-index) 
 








Appendix 3: Overview of regressions 
Time Frame  Country  Regression 
Tax rate 
coefficient  Adj-R
2  D-F test 
 
1929 – 1980 
 
US 
   
0.361**





2002 – 2009 
 
Euro Zone 


























0.224**  0.42 
No unit 
root 
Source: Made by the authors using monthly data collected on the Euro zone from 2002 - 200, yearly data provided by Tanzi (1980) 
and an extended panel data on the US from 1929 – 2006, see appendix 2 on a detailed description of the data and the data collection. 
                                                           
7 The sign ** means significant on a 5% level. When there is no sign, results are insignificant. 
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Appendix 4: Results of the regressions done using the variables listed in Table 2 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 


















                   
Y  -0.4363***  -0.4422***  -0.4361***  -0.4277***  -0.8968***  -0.8605***  -0.8901***  -0.8524***  -0.4727*** 
  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.082)  (0.175)  (0.169)  (0.167)  (0.163)  (0.082) 
R  0.0005  -0.0087  -0.0006  -0.0029  -0.0019  0.0000  -0.0037  -0.0013  0.0126 
  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
WS/NI  -0.3788  -0.4293  -0.3817  -0.3206  -0.5302  -0.4151  -0.5799  -0.4405  -0.3948 
  (0.330)  (0.334)  (0.337)  (0.337)  (0.619)  (0.568)  (0.603)  (0.554)  (0.319) 
Unemployment    -0.0384               
    (0.039)               
Tax rate      0.0116             
      (0.134)             
Government share        -0.1469           
        (0.160)           
Police expenditures          -0.3305         
          (0.446)         
Judicial expenditures            -0.3631       
            (0.276)       
Police exp p/c              -0.3973     
              (0.362)     
Judicial exp p/c                -0.4108   
                (0.253)   
Total crime rate                  -0.1716* 
                  (0.096) 
Constant  0.0146**  0.0148**  0.0145**  0.0130*  0.0770**  0.0817***  0.0768***  0.0805***  0.0213*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.007) 
                   
Observations  37  37  37  37  20  20  20  20  37 
R-squared  0.613  0.624  0.613  0.622  0.717  0.737  0.728  0.751  0.648 
Adjusted R-squared  0.577  0.577  0.564  0.575  0.642  0.667  0.656  0.684  0.604 
The  upper  number  in  each  cell  is  the  applicable  coefficient,  the  number  below,  between  brackets,  is  the  corresponding  standard  deviation,  *  indicates 




  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 


















                   
Y  -0.4765***  -0.4495***  -0.4692***  -0.4720***  -0.4427***  -0.4723***  -0.4285***  -0.4761***  -0.4353*** 
  (0.082)  (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.084)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.085)  (0.083) 
R  0.0126  0.0082  0.0131  0.0106  0.0046  0.0125  -0.0019  0.0017  0.0024 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
WS/NI  -0.4021  -0.3565  -0.3688  -0.4252  -0.3310  -0.3965  -0.3696  -0.5302  -0.3568 
  (0.318)  (0.323)  (0.310)  (0.326)  (0.333)  (0.320)  (0.335)  (0.341)  (0.338) 
Total crime rate p/c  -0.1778*                 
  (0.095)                 
Robberies    -0.0893               
    (0.056)               
Burglaries      -0.1749**             
      (0.075)             
Larceny thefts        -0.1394           
        (0.098)           
Vehicle thefts          -0.0864         
          (0.085)         
Property crimes            -0.1669*       
            (0.096)       
Elementary <5 yrs              -0.0441     
              (0.124)     
Elementary white                0.3130   
                (0.217)   
Elementary black                  -0.0291 
                  (0.113) 
Constant  0.0197***  0.0184**  0.0194***  0.0206**  0.0175**  0.0209***  0.0130  0.0244**  0.0141 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
                   
Observations  37  37  37  37  37  37  37  37  36 
R-squared  0.651  0.641  0.669  0.636  0.625  0.646  0.614  0.636  0.618 
Adjusted R-squared  0.607  0.596  0.627  0.590  0.578  0.602  0.566  0.591  0.569 
The upper number in each cell is the applicable coefficient, the number below, between brackets, is the corresponding standard deviation, * indicates significance 




  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26) 
















                 
Y  -0.4446***  -0.4277***  -0.4520***  -0.4640***  -0.4342***  -0.4351***  -0.4607***  -0.4417*** 
  (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.082) 
R  0.0031  -0.0038  -0.0018  0.0080  0.0001  -0.0055  0.0098  0.0036 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
WS/NI  -0.3858  -0.4008  -0.4495  -0.4264  -0.3758  -0.3829  -0.4160  -0.3794 
  (0.334)  (0.334)  (0.352)  (0.332)  (0.336)  (0.334)  (0.322)  (0.332) 
Elementary male  0.0883               
  (0.177)               
Elementary female    -0.1404             
    (0.216)             
Elementary male white      0.0929           
      (0.151)           
Elementary female white        0.2177         
        (0.206)         
Elementary male black          0.0085       
          (0.082)       
Elementary female black            0.0806     
            (0.091)     
High school finished              -0.9136   
              (0.541)   
High school white                -0.1416 
                (0.191) 
Constant  0.0177*  0.0104  0.0178**  0.0213**  0.0149**  0.0177**  0.0282***  0.0171** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
                 
Observations  37  37  37  37  37  36  37  37 
R-squared  0.616  0.618  0.617  0.626  0.613  0.627  0.644  0.619 
Adjusted R-squared  0.567  0.570  0.569  0.579  0.564  0.579  0.600  0.571 
The  upper  number  in  each  cell  is  the  applicable  coefficient,  the  number  below,  between  brackets,  is  the  corresponding  standard  deviation,  *  indicates 





  (27)  (28)  (29)  (30)  (31)  (32)  (33)  (34) 
















                 
Y  -0.4358***  -0.4597***  -0.4592***  -0.4596***  -0.4390***  -0.4314***  -0.4364***  -0.4252*** 
  (0.082)  (0.079)  (0.081)  (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.080)  (0.083)  (0.083) 
R  0.0092  0.0102  0.0088  0.0081  0.0025  0.0126  0.0038  0.0069 
  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
WS/NI  -0.3011  -0.3884  -0.4364  -0.4289  -0.3755  -0.2570  -0.3503  -0.2765 
  (0.339)  (0.315)  (0.325)  (0.331)  (0.333)  (0.330)  (0.340)  (0.342) 
High school black  -0.2844               
  (0.290)               
High school male    -1.0041**             
    (0.492)             
High school female      -0.8903           
      (0.568)           
High school female white        -0.7507         
        (0.651)         
High school male white          -0.0557       
          (0.101)       
High school male black            -0.3949     
            (0.242)     
High school female black              -0.0807   
              (0.258)   
Income inequality GINI                0.4848 
                (0.482) 
Constant  0.0241**  0.0297***  0.0275**  0.0266**  0.0157**  0.0275**  0.0178*  0.0139* 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
                 
Observations  36  37  37  37  37  37  36  35 
R-squared  0.629  0.657  0.640  0.628  0.616  0.642  0.619  0.636 
Adjusted R-squared  0.581  0.614  0.595  0.581  0.568  0.598  0.570  0.587 
The  upper  number  in  each  cell  is  the  applicable  coefficient,  the  number  below,  between  brackets,  is  the  corresponding  standard  deviation,  *  indicates 















































1965 1970 1975 1980
Starting period (end period is 30 years later)
Coefficient Confidence interval (95 %)
 
Source: Made by the authors using regression (5) on the period 1965-2002. One should read this figure as follows: The straight line 
shows how the coefficient of high school males develops over time with 30 year periods (the first observation is 1965-1995, the next 
observation is the period 1966-1996 etc.) the dashed lines above and under the coefficient line show the confidence interval of the 
coefficient on a 5% significance level. This means that when zero lies within the confidence interval (like happens for the first time in 
the period of 1967-1997) the coefficient is not significant different from zero at the 5% significance level.  
 